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Recent decades have witnessed the emergence and spread of a broad range of liberal norms in global governance, among
them sustainable development, gender equality, and human security. While existing scholarship tells us a lot about the
trajectories of particular norms, we know much less about the broader patterns and sources of commitments to liberal norms
by international organizations (IOs). This article offers the first comparative large-N analysis of such commitments, building
on a unique dataset on IO policy decisions over the time period 1980–2015. Distinguishing between deep norm commitment
and shallow norm recognition, the analysis produces several novel findings. We establish that IOs’ deeper commitments to
liberal norms primarily are driven by internal conditions: democratic memberships and institutional designs more conducive
to norm entrepreneurship. In contrast, legitimacy standards in the external environment of IOs, often invoked in existing
research, mainly account for shallower recognition or “talk” of norms.
Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence and spread
of a broad range of liberal norms in global governance.
From hardly being recognized as global policy principles
in the 1970s, norms such as sustainable development,
gender equality, human security, good governance, and
deregulation have been integrated into the policy portfolios
of many international organizations (IOs). This develop-
ment has inspired an impressive literature on norms in
global governance, examining, for instance, the importance
of norm entrepreneurship (Finnemore 1993; Keck and
Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999;
True and Mintrom 2001; Joachim 2003), the evolution
and contestation of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;
Sandholtz 2007; Kelley 2008; Krook and True 2012; Towns
2012; Wiener 2018; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019),
and the processes of norm effectiveness (Acharya 2004;
Simmons 2009; Sikkink 2011; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
2013; Zimmermann 2017).
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Existing scholarship tells us a lot about the trajectories
of particular norms. But we know less about the broader
patterns and sources of commitments to norms in global
governance, especially as they are espoused by IOs. How
have norms spread across IOs and over time? Are some
norms adopted by IOs more quickly or broadly than others?
Are some IOs generally leaders or laggards in the uptake of
new norms? And, perhaps most importantly, what explains
variation in norm commitments by IOs?
Commitments to norms by IOs are consequential for
states and societies. Norms focus attention on particular
problems, prescribe or proscribe behaviors, and may gener-
ate distributional effects. When integrated into the policies
of an IO, norms guide subsequent decisions by the organi-
zation, affect its allocation of resources, and place demands
on its member states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin
and Simmons 2012). Such policy commitments by an IO
may in turn strengthen norms as prescriptive principles,
contributing to further norm cascades (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Empirical
research documents effects of norm commitments by IOs
across a variety of policy fields, including election monitor-
ing (Kelley 2012), gender equality (Simmons 2009), global
development (Park and Vetterlein 2010), human rights
(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013), international security
(Gheciu 2005), and sustainable development (Biermann
and Siebenhüner 2009). Whether, how, and why norms
spread among IOs therefore matters for real-world con-
cerns in international politics.
A common explanation of liberal norm commitment by
IOs privileges a diffusion of global scripts. It suggests that
IOs are driven by concerns of organizational legitimacy and
look to their external environment when deciding whether
to embrace a new norm. The more prominent a norm is
within an IO’s organizational field and wider society, the
more likely it is to be adopted. The result is a global diffu-
sion of liberal policies and institutions broadly considered
appropriate. This explanation suggests IOs may demon-
strate homogeneity in norm commitment, despite different
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functional tasks, memberships, and geographical origins.
This explanation informs recent accounts of the spread of
accountability mechanisms, civil society instruments, good
governance policies, human rights provisions, and parlia-
mentary institutions across IOs (Grigorescu 2010; Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 2013; Börzel and van Hüllen 2015; Risse
2016; Rocabert et al. 2019; Sommerer and Tallberg 2019).
However, this account struggles to explain important
patterns of variation in IOs’ commitments to norms. IOs
differ in whether they have policies dedicated to a norm.
For example, the United Nations (UN), African Union
(AU), and Commonwealth, among others, have full-fledged
policies on gender equality, while others like the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) do not. Similarly, some IOs are
quicker than others to adopt norms. The European Union
(EU) adopted a policy on sustainable development already
in 1992, while the Organization for Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) did not do so until 2012.
We advance an alternative explanation of IOs’ commit-
ments to liberal norms that account for variation across IOs
by privileging actors and institutions in the internal ma-
chinery of IO policy-making. Starting from the premise that
entrepreneurs aim to convince IOs of new norms, it theo-
rizes the conditions under which organizations are more
likely to be receptive to such overtures. Specifically, it high-
lights two conditions as decisive for IOs’ openness to liberal
norm entrepreneurship and their resulting commitments.
First, IOs whose memberships are more democratic offer
more hospitable environments for state, supranational,
and transnational entrepreneurs promoting new liberal
norms. Second, IOs whose institutional designs are charac-
terized by more pooling of decision-making authority, more
delegation to supranational bodies, and more access for
transnational actors (TNAs) are more conducive to norm
entrepreneurship. This account suggests that liberal norm
commitment by IOs varies in foreseeable ways and identifies
which conditions are particularly favorable to commitment.
We test these explanations through the first comparative
large-N analysis of norm commitment by IOs. Building on a
unique dataset on IO policy decisions, we map and explain
the spread of eight liberal norms across eighteen multi-issue
IOs from 1980 to 2015. To identify norm commitment, we
collected and analyzed all policy decisions taken by the main
intergovernmental decision-making bodies of these IOs over
the full time period. To differentiate between an IO’s com-
mitment to a norm and shallower “talk” about a norm, we
use two alternative measures. We identify commitment as the
first codification of a norm through a full policy devoted to
its implementation, and recognition as the first rhetorical ref-
erence to a norm in IO policy. This research design breaks
with previous scholarship on norms, which seldom is com-
parative in orientation and so far has not differentiated sys-
tematically between commitment and talk.1
The findings lend strong support to our argument. The
analysis shows that norm commitment by IOs is driven by in-
ternal conditions conducive to norm entrepreneurship: the
democratic density of memberships and the degree to which
institutional designs provide for pooling, delegation, and
TNA access. As a result, norm commitment is concentrated
to the liberal core of IOs with largely or entirely democratic
memberships and institutional rules that facilitate norm
1For two exceptions, see Park and Vetterlein (2010), who study the adoption
of nine policy norms by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
and Börzel and van Hüllen (2015), who study the adoption of good governance
policies across twelve regional IOs.
entrepreneurship. In contrast, the findings offer more lim-
ited support for global scripts about appropriate action as
an explanation of norm commitment by IOs. This does not
mean that this account is all wrong. If we focus on shallow
recognition of norms by IOs, we find such talk or lip service
is best explained by a norm’s prominence in an IO’s exter-
nal environment. Taken together, these findings suggest an
important corrective to existing knowledge: while global
scripts help us to understand why norms spread across IOs at
a rhetorical level, accounting for deeper norm commitment
requires an appreciation of the role of democracies and
institutional rules that facilitate norm entrepreneurship.
Our findings have several broader implications. First,
they demonstrate how careful empirical measurement may
allow us to identify the multiple logics of action that drive
IOs, as well as the scope conditions under which they hold.
Second, our findings show how a large-N approach to norms
can complement prevailing qualitative work by identifying
general sources of variation in the spread of norms. Third,
they raise critical questions about the performance of IOs,
showing that organizations frequently stop at rhetorical
recognition, indicating less effectiveness of norms than
is often assumed based on public discourse. Finally, our
findings suggest why liberal norms may face retrenchment
in global governance: while they were never fully supported
outside democratic IOs, liberal norms are now weakened
from within as well, as authoritarian tendencies gain ground
even within the democratic core.
The article proceeds in four steps. First, we introduce our
dataset and illustrate how IO commitment to norms varies.
Second, we outline two theoretical explanations for when
IOs might be inclined to make norm commitments. Third,
we assess the explanatory power of these accounts based
on multivariate analysis. Finally, we summarize the findings
and discuss the broader implications for research on global
norms, IOs, and the liberal international order.
Liberal Norm Commitments by IOs, 1980–2015
We describe the central patterns in liberal norm commit-
ments by IOs based on a novel dataset covering eight liberal
norms and eighteen IOs over the period 1980–2015. The
norms included are democracy promotion, gender equality,
good governance, sustainable development, deregulation,
debt relief, human security, and responsibility to protect
(R2P). These principles qualify as norms because they artic-
ulate shared standards of appropriate behavior (Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998). This does not mean that they were not
once contested or are now taken for granted. Indeed, as
we will show, commitments to these norms vary significantly
among states and IOs.
We have selected these eight norms based on four con-
siderations. First, they are all grounded in liberal political
ideals, stressing individual freedom, equal rights, eco-
nomic openness, social justice, and democratic governance
(Moravcsik 1997, 525–27). Since liberalism is a multivalent
and contested concept (Gaus 2018), we have chosen a broad
and inclusive approach. While these norms all appreciate
liberty as a core political value, each norm may be more
strongly associated with a distinct strand of liberalism. For
instance, the norms of gender equality, human security, and
R2P build on individual rights as emphasized in classical
liberalism. Deregulation builds on ideas of limited govern-
ment interference in the market associated with economic
liberalism. Debt relief and sustainable development accord
with conceptions of social justice inherent to social or new
liberalism. Democracy promotion and good governance
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emphasize principles common to most strands of political
liberalism. These norms contrast with illiberal international
norms, such as non-interference, which privileges state
sovereignty at the expense of individual and humanitarian
values.
Second, these eight norms cover a wide range of issues in
global governance, from development and environmental
protection to security and human rights. They also address
the broad domains where norms have been identified in
previous research (see Table A1 in the online appendix).
This variety allows us to go beyond norm-specific accounts
and assess general explanations of norm commitment by
IOs. Third, these norms have all emerged and spread over
the past four decades, and several have reached a status of
prominence in international political discourse (see Figure
A1 in the online appendix). Concentrating on norms that
have emerged during the same time period facilitates com-
parative analysis. Fourth, while their substantive content
differs, these eight norms are comparable with regard
to their nature and scope. All are regulative self-binding
norms, which prescribe or proscribe certain behavior of IOs
and their member states, rather than other binding norms
directed at third parties, such as the norm of corporate
social responsibility.
Our sample of IOs (Table A2 in the online appendix) is
guided by three considerations.2 First, all eighteen IOs have
a multi-issue orientation, ensuring that the eight norms are
potentially relevant to their activities.3 Several of the norms
we study make little sense for specialized single-issue IOs.
Second, the sample has a wide geographic scope. It includes
six global IOs and twelve regional IOs, three from each of
the four major world regions (Europe, Africa, Americas,
and Asia-Pacific). This stratified selection mirrors the dis-
tribution in the full population of fifty-four multi-issue IOs
included in the correlates of war–intergovernmental orga-
nization (COW-IGO) dataset and corresponds to one-third
of this population (Table A3 in the online appendix). Third
and crucially, this sample ensures variation on the explana-
tory factors we examine, including the democratic composi-
tion of IO memberships and the institutional design of IOs.
In accord with earlier research, we look at formal pol-
icy decisions to identify norm commitment (Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998; Park and Vetterlein 2010; Börzel and
Stapel 2015). To identify norm commitment, we collected
and analyzed all policy decisions taken by each IO’s main
intergovernmental decision-making body between 1980
and 2015.4 The policy decisions, such as resolutions, dec-
larations, and decisions, were gathered from each IO’s
electronic and physical archives, producing a corpus of
about 45,000 documents. We focus on the policy deci-
sions of the main intergovernmental decision-making body
because they represent the collective will of the IO and
constitute the strongest possible form of political commit-
ment an IO can make. In comparison, policies developed in
other parts of an IO’s machinery are less optimal indicators.
IO bureaucracies produce reports or guidelines promot-
ing norms, but the documents do not necessarily reflect
the collective will of the IO membership. Similarly, lower
2We define IOs as formal intergovernmental, multilateral, and bureaucratic
organizations established to further cooperation among states.
3An IO is regarded as multi-issue if its mandate covers more than three issue
areas. As described later, we control for heterogeneity in the fit between norms
and IO mandates.
4We select the main interstate decision-making body according to the spec-
ification of organizational tasks in founding treaties. For the UN, we select the
General Assembly, since it has a broader mandate, more inclusive membership,
and more central role in the UN’s norm development, than the Security Council.
level IO organs may develop policy documents invoking
norms, but these do not entail the same level of political
commitment as top-level decisions. In other words, it is
precisely because they are taken by the full membership at
the pinnacle of the organization that policy decisions by the
main intergovernmental decision-making body represent a
good approximation of norm commitment by IOs.
We develop two measures to capture the degree to which
an IO embraces a norm, which we subsequently use in
searches of the corpus.5 The principal measure—norm
commitment—represents the first full, comprehensive policy
devoted to implementing or promoting a norm. As these
policy decisions emerge from negotiations in which an IO’s
membership agrees to codify a norm, norm commitment
is probably closest to what most people think of as norm
adoption. It reflects the first time an IO makes an assurance
that it will integrate the norm in its operations by mobilizing
resources and developing a framework to follow through
on the decision. In our coding, full policies are identified
through documents in which the norm represents the main
content of the policy decision (see Table A6 in the online
appendix).
The second measure—norm recognition—represents the
IO’s first rhetorical reference to a norm in its policy output.
First references suggest that an IO’s main decision-making
body recognizes a norm and regards it as sufficiently im-
portant to merit a discussion and formal recording at the
highest political level. However, they do not amount to
a firm commitment to a norm and thus represent only a
shallow endorsement of a norm, not a dominant frame
for multilateral negotiations. When such first references
are not followed by deeper commitments, they may be
accurately described as rhetoric, talk or lip service.
One important difference between commitment and
recognition refers to norm robustness (Deitelhoff and Zim-
mermann 2019). We assume that the robustness of norms in
discourse and practice is higher in the case of commitment
compared to recognition (Legro 1997, 35). Just like struc-
tural factors that shield norms against challenge (Wiener
2018), the legal character of a full policy makes a norm
less prone to weakening by contestation (Deitelhoff and
Zimmermann 2019, 10).
The two measures can be illustrated by comparing the
adoption by the UN and the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization (SCO) of the norm of sustainable development.
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) made a first reference
to “sustainable development” in Resolution 35/73 in 1980.
The main topic of this resolution is a different one, and thus
it counts as norm recognition. When the UNGA adopted
Resolution 47/190 in 1992, endorsing the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, the decision urged
member states to ensure “the means of implementation
[of] Agenda 21, stressing in particular the importance of fi-
nancial resources and mechanisms.” The 1992 commitment
to Agenda 21 paved the way for subsequent deepening of
UN policy on sustainable development, including the 2015
Sustainable Development Goals. Since the 1992 resolu-
tion represents the first UN decision setting out a collective
pledge to implement sustainable development, incorporates
extensive and specific provisions, and provides a framework
for subsequent policy, it counts as norm commitment. In
contrast, when the Summit of the SCO in 1998 adopted a
5The main search term was the exact wording of the norm. We also searched
for widely used acronyms (“R2P”) and reformulations (“promotion of democ-
racy”; “relief of debt”). For deregulation, we included the terms “liberalization”
and “privatization.”
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Figure 1. IO norm commitment and recognition, by norm, 1980–2015
communiqué that set out the goal of achieving “durable
peace and sustainable development of the region,” the doc-
ument only made a cursory reference to the norm and did
not pave the way for successive and more far-reaching com-
mitments. We therefore code it as norm recognition.
Using this two-fold measure, we map how the eighteen
IOs embrace our eight norms through policy decisions
between 1980 and 2015.6 Figure 1 suggests several observa-
tions. First, norm commitment (as indicated by the black
markers) varies across norms and IOs. The majority of IOs
have committed to sustainable development (fifteen IOs),
gender equality (eleven IOs), and good governance (nine
IOs), while commitments by IOs are rarer for some norms,
specifically human security, R2P, and debt relief.
Second, some IOs commit to norms earlier than others.
In the case of gender equality, for instance, we saw a first
wave of commitments in the early 1980s, followed by a
second wave in the early 2000s, and then a third after 2010.
And while the EU and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) already committed
6 In some cases, the first reference and full policy are found in the same doc-
ument or year.
to the norm of deregulation at the beginning of our obser-
vation period, IOs like the Council of Europe (COE), the
UN, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
followed about fifteen years later.
Third, some IOs commit to a larger number of norms
than others. The UN stands out with full policies on all
eight norms, followed by the EU and the COE with five
commitments each (see also Figure A2 in the online
appendix). Three IOs have committed to only one norm—
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), SADC,
and CARICOM—while the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
and SCO have committed to none.
Finally, not all IOs commit to norms that they recognize.
Norm recognition is relatively high; six of the eight norms
are recognized by at least half of the sample of IOs. Two
norms, debt relief and human security, are predominantly
endorsed at this shallower level suggesting that their inter-
national presence is a function of norm talk not matched by
deeper commitments. Some IOs seem more inclined to fol-
low up recognition with a full policy. For example, the UN
committed to seven norms that it had previously recognized.
The time span between these two levels varies considerably,
from one year (e.g., good governance in the COE) to twenty
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plus years (e.g., sustainable development in the AU). Also,
some IOs distinguish themselves by rarely going beyond
norm recognition; notably, SADC has recognized five norms
but only committed to one (sustainable development).
Explaining Norm Commitment by IOs: Theories and
Hypotheses
The previous section showed that liberal norms have spread
across IOs over time, while also highlighting significant
variation in commitment. In this section, we outline two
alternative accounts of this development: an explanation
centered on the diffusion of global scripts and our privi-
leged explanation centered on conditions internal to an IO
that make it conducive to norm entrepreneurship.
External Conditions: Diffusion of Global Liberal Scripts
A common explanation of norm commitment by IOs priv-
ileges the diffusion of global liberal scripts, understood as
templates of appropriate liberal standards. This explanation
is grounded in the sociological institutionalist notion that
organizations adopt features considered legitimate by their
external environment. Accordingly, institutions and policies
do not spread across organizations because of their func-
tional virtues, but because the wider environment supports
and legitimizes them (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The exter-
nal environment consists of peers in the organizational field
as well as the broader society in which organizations are
embedded (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997).
The environment matters, not because it presents compe-
tition, but because it conveys standards of appropriateness,
and conformance to these standards gives organizations
legitimacy, resources, stability, and sustainability. This logic
is usually referred to as emulation in the literature on diffu-
sion and has been used to explain patterns of isomorphism
in various contexts (see Simmons et al. 2006; Gilardi 2012).
In IR, this approach has become increasingly influential
as scholars have recognized its potential to explain orga-
nizational similarities in world politics (Finnemore 1996).
Important contributions draw on this logic to explain the
spread of macro-institutional arrangements in global gov-
ernance, such as regionalism (Risse 2016), multilateralism
(Ruggie 1992), and transnational governance (Dingwerth
and Pattberg 2009). In research on IOs, this perspective ac-
counts for why these organizations sometimes demonstrate
significant homogeneity, despite different functional tasks,
memberships, and geographical origins. A range of studies
suggest that IOs look to their external environment when
deciding whether to adopt a particular design or policy,
giving rise to homogeneity across organizations. While
the terminology used to describe these processes varies,
the literature increasingly refers to a diffusion, emulation,
or mimicking of global liberal scripts. In differentiating
these claims from our alternative account, it is important
to recognize both the logic at work—diffusion of exter-
nally legitimated models—and the resulting pattern of
adoption—a spread beyond the liberal core of IOs with
democratic memberships.
A number of contributions highlight how liberal demo-
cratic designs have spread across IOs, reflecting templates
considered appropriate among peers and in society. Several
studies show how a growing number of IOs have estab-
lished international parliamentary institutions to legitimize
themselves (Rittberger and Schroder 2016; Rocabert et al.
2019). This global trend extends to IOs whose member-
ships are authoritarian, pointing to the strong impact of
externally legitimated models. Other studies submit that
IOs’ increasing tendency to open up to civil society actors
reflects the diffusion of a new global participatory practice,
spreading to IOs outside the liberal core, such as the AU
and OIC (Steffek et al. 2008; Sommerer and Tallberg
2019). A similar argument has been advanced to account
for the spread of accountability mechanisms, transparency
policies, and dispute settlement mechanisms across IOs
(Grigorescu 2010; Alter 2012). One telling illustration of
this explanatory logic finds that prior adoption by peers
in an organization’s environment trumps all IO-specific
factors in explaining accountability mechanisms, including
democratic memberships (Grigorescu 2010).
Likewise, several contributions explain the spread of
liberal policies among IOs by invoking the notion of global
scripts. According to one influential study, human rights
originated in the West, but subsequently gained universal
prescriptive status: “[T]he norm-guided logic of appro-
priateness now requires both governments and non-state
actors in world society to at least pay lip service to the idea
that there are such things as fundamental human rights”
(Risse and Ropp 2013, 9). Another study traces the spread
of policies on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and
anti-corruption across regional IOs over recent decades,
submitting that “these standards for legitimate governance
institutions form part of a global script for “good gover-
nance,” which enjoys universal acceptance” (Börzel and
Stapel 2015, 24). Similarly, emulation is the favored expla-
nation for the global spread of regional integration—often
modeled on the EU and extended to non-Western IOs such
as the Andean Community CAN and ASEAN (Jetschke and
Murray 2012; Risse 2016; Lenz and Burilkov 2017).
This logic of global liberal scripts yields two hypotheses,
focused on the main sources of legitimate standards in the
external environment. The first highlights the importance
of organizational fields, suggesting that IOs are more likely
to commit to a liberal norm if peer IOs already have done
so. The second emphasizes the importance of the broader
societal environment in which IOs are embedded, stipulat-
ing that IOs are more likely to commit to a liberal norm
that is prominent in wider society.
H1: The greater the prominence of a liberal norm among
peers in an IO’s organizational field, the more likely the IO
is to commit to this norm.
H2: The greater the prominence of a liberal norm in wider
society, the more likely the IO is to commit to this norm.
Internal Conditions for Norm Entrepreneurship: Democratic Density
and Institutional Design
The descriptive patterns identified earlier raise doubts
about the extent to which the spread of global liberal
scripts can explain norm commitment by IOs. Importantly,
commitment to liberal norms appears to be more selective
than a logic of global scripts would suggest. While IOs’
recognition of norms is reminiscent of an isomorphic pat-
tern,7 IOs’ deeper commitment to norms appears to follow
a different logic. In the following, we therefore advance an
alternative account that privileges actors and institutions
in the internal machinery of policy-making. This account
7For several norms—deregulation, gender equality, good governance, and
sustainable development—the pattern of recognition over time resembles the typ-
ical S-curve of diffusion. While this is not readily visible in Figure 1, because the
figure orders IOs according to norm commitment (not recognition), it shows
more clearly in Figure A1 in the online appendix.
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draws from earlier research on democratic density and
institutional design to identify conditions internal to an IO
that shape the success of liberal norm entrepreneurship.
It integrates theories of how memberships and institutions
matter into a coherent account to explain IO commitments
to liberal norms. It suggests that IOs are more conducive
to liberal norm entrepreneurship when their memberships
are more democratic and their institutional designs involve
more delegation, pooling, and access, making them more
likely to commit to liberal norms.
We start from the premise that IOs in general face efforts
by entrepreneurs to convince them of the appropriateness
of new liberal norms. While simplifying, this assumption
is consistent with a rich literature focused on states, supra-
national bureaucracies, and TNAs as norm entrepreneurs.
Work on state entrepreneurs shows how governments seek
to use their standing in IOs to place new norms on the
agenda, build support among the likeminded, shame op-
ponents, and push for adoption (Waltz 2001; Kelley 2008;
Park and Vetterlein 2010; Sikkink 2011). Studies on supra-
national entrepreneurs highlight that “many IO staff have
as their stated purpose to shape state action by establishing
best practices and by articulating and transmitting norms
that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate
state behavior” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 33; see also
Hawkins et al. 2006; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009;
Johnson 2014). Accounts of transnational entrepreneurship
demonstrate how NGOs, interest groups, and epistemic
communities employ their information, credibility, and
moral authority to persuade IOs to adopt norms (Keck and
Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Joachim 2003; Betsill and Corell
2008; Tallberg et al. 2018).
Assuming IOs face such demands to integrate liberal
norms, a first condition shaping the likelihood of commit-
ment is the democratic density of memberships (Pevehouse
2005, 46). We expect that entrepreneurs will be more
successful in convincing IOs to embrace liberal norms
when their memberships are more democratic. For democ-
racies, liberal ideals come naturally, making it easier for
state, supranational, and transnational norm entrepreneurs
to find allies in the membership and build support for
commitment.
This argument builds on the assumption that states’
preferences over international outcomes are partly rooted
in domestic political conditions. This logic is sometimes
referred to as “liberal constructivism” (Risse-Kappen 1996)
or “ideational liberalism” (Moravcsik 1997) as it derives
the preferences that states promote internationally from
their domestic commitments to particular political ideals.
A fundamental feature of such domestic conditions is the
distinction between democratic and autocratic rule, leading
democracies and autocracies to promote systematically
different ideals abroad.
Democracy as a political system rests on liberal political
ideals, some of which pertain to the organization of the
polity and have become constitutive of democracy (e.g., free
and fair elections, individual rights, rule of law), and some
of which pertain to the organization of society and have
become particularly common in democracies (e.g., equality,
economic openness, social justice). These domestic political
ideals make democracies more likely to favor liberal inter-
national outcomes than autocracies (e.g., Mansfield et al.
2000; Pevehouse 2005; Simmons 2009; Tallberg, Sommerer,
and Squatrito 2016).
When IO memberships are democratically dense, com-
mitment to liberal norms becomes more likely. Norm en-
trepreneurs are then more likely to encounter an audience
receptive to their advocacy efforts. Since democratic states
already adhere to liberal principles domestically, accepting
these ideals internationally is not a radical step. Liberal
norm entrepreneurs will therefore find more like-minded
states with whom to partner and face fewer hurdles as they
seek to convince the membership of commitment. Con-
versely, efforts to promote liberal norms can face greater
resistance in IOs with less democratic memberships. Norm
entrepreneurs are more likely to encounter an audience
that perceives liberal ideals as foreign, potentially threaten-
ing to domestic control, and synonymous with demands for
adjustment. Gaining deep acceptance for new liberal norms
in this inhospitable environment will be more difficult.
The second condition shaping the likelihood of IOs
committing to liberal norms are the institutional rules shap-
ing norm entrepreneurship. Institutional rules specify who
has standing in policy-making, what authority these actors
enjoy, and how decisions are made. In our account, insti-
tutional rules matter by enabling and constraining norm
entrepreneurs as these actors seek to influence IO policy.
We focus theoretically on design features that we expect to
be important in this respect, leaving aside other dimensions
of institutional design.8 We focus on one central institu-
tional condition for each type of entrepreneur: pooling,
delegation, and TNA access.
First, state entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful
when institutional rules provide for a higher degree of
pooling in interstate decision-making. Pooling refers to
majoritarian decision-making and has implications for the
capacity of state entrepreneurs to secure the required level
of support for norms (Hooghe et al. 2017). The lower
the institutional threshold, the easier it is for a state en-
trepreneur to push through a commitment to a norm, all
else equal. When IO decisions require unanimous support,
all member states have to be convinced, making the mission
of a state entrepreneur more difficult. By contrast, when IO
decisions only require the support of a simple or qualified
majority, it becomes easier for a state entrepreneur to build
a winning coalition (Scharpf 1997).9
Second, supranational entrepreneurs are more likely
to be successful when institutional rules delegate more
power to international bureaucracies. IOs vary extensively
in the extent to which they delegate agenda-setting, im-
plementation, and enforcement powers to international
bureaucracies (Hooghe et al. 2017). This variation in dele-
gated authority influences the ability of supranational actors
to exert influence over outcomes (Barnett and Finnemore
2004; Hawkins et al. 2006). Delegation comes with greater
opportunities for IO staff to shape agendas and policies.
It is not a coincidence that some of the most prominent
examples of supranational entrepreneurship involve IOs
such as the EU, IMF, and World Bank, all of which have
highly empowered international bureaucracies.
Third, transnational entrepreneurs are more likely to
be successful when institutional rules provide for non-state
access to IO policy-making. The openness of IOs to TNAs
has expanded considerably in recent decades, yet continues
to vary across organizations (Tallberg et al. 2014). While
some IOs grant TNAs considerable access to policy-making,
others remain closed. Such variation is likely to affect TNAs’
abilities to convince IOs to adopt new norms. Institutional
access is frequently identified as a central determinant of
TNA influence in IOs and multilateral negotiations (Betsill
and Corell 2008; Tallberg et al. 2018). Rather than having
to rely exclusively on strategies of outside lobbying, such as
8We control for other IO features in the main analysis and robustness checks.
9The possibilities for supranational and transnational entrepreneurs to se-
cure IO norm commitment similarly increase with a lower institutional threshold.
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Figure 2. Average norm commitment by democratic density in IO memberships.
Notes:Categorization based on average democratic density scores of IO members (Table A5 in the online appendix). Norms
abbreviations: debt relief (DR), democracy promotion (DP), deregulation (DER), gender equality (GE), good governance
(GG), human security (HS), responsibility to protect (R2P), and sustainable development (SD).
mobilizing public opinion, TNAs with access can employ a
broader range of resources and strategies, including inside
lobbying and information exchange.
In sum, our argument leads to the following expectations:
H3: The higher the democratic density of an IO’s member-
ship, the more likely the IO is to commit to a liberal norm.
H4: The more an IO’s institutional rules provide for pool-
ing, delegation, and access, the more likely the IO is to
commit to a liberal norm.
Empirical Analysis
We begin by assessing the distribution of norm commitment
across the key features of our privileged argument—
democratic density and institutional rules. Figure 2 plots
the commitment rates for three categories of IOs, sorted
by the democratic density of the membership. We note
that IOs with the highest share of democratic members
tend to adopt norms sooner. The medium category of IOs
exhibits slower but more expansive commitments, mainly
because the UN falls in this group, while the IOs with the
lowest share of democratic states trail both groups in scope
and speed. We observe a similar pattern when plotting the
average adoption rates by institutional rules (Figure 3). IOs
with higher levels of pooling, delegation, and TNA access
tend to adopt more norms, and sooner, than IOs with lower
levels. Overall, these patterns offer preliminary support for
our argument.10
Even though our analysis does not cover illiberal norms,
these patterns suggest that memberships and institutions
may help to explain IOs’ treatment of norms such as
non-intervention. The IOs with lower democratic density
demonstrate efforts by state entrepreneurs to consolidate
non-intervention as a norm, while resisting norms that con-
flict with it, notably, R2P.11 For example, ASEAN members
have remained committed to non-intervention and resisted
pressure to adopt R2P as a guiding principle for the orga-
nization (Bellamy and Drummond 2011). Instead, ASEAN,
10We note that democratic density is correlated with both delegation
(r = 0.32) and TNA access (r = 0.42). While this means that democratic density
to some extent predicts delegation and TNA access, our sample contains IOs with
considerable diversity regarding these variables. For example, the Nordic Council
scores high on democratic density (0.85) but low on delegation (0.09), whereas
the AU scores low on democratic density (0.25) but above average on delegation
(0.25) and TNA access (0.31).
11Non-intervention is not a new norm, and most IOs give it some recognition.
For example, non-intervention is codified in the UN Charter.
which scores low on democratic density and medium on
institutional rules, has sought to adjust the principle of non-
intervention to allow for superficial integration of R2P.12
This example suggests that conditions for illiberal norm
entrepreneurship may be more favorable in IOs with less
democratic memberships and permissive institutional rules.
Multivariate Analysis: Modeling Specification and Measurements
To test our hypotheses regarding IO norm commitment,
we employ pooled event history analysis (PEHA), conven-
tionally used in diffusion research (Shipan and Volden
2006; Kreitzer and Boehmke 2016). Given our interest in
the broader dynamics of IO norm commitment, rather
than in the determinants of particular norms, PEHA allows
us to study the effects of variables across multiple norms
and diverse IOs in a single model. Following Kreitzer
and Boehmke (2016), we implement PEHA by estimating
parameters for average effects of covariates on norm com-
mitment using multilevel logit models, capturing temporal
effects with a simple polynomial. The unit of analysis is
IO-norm-year, with IO-years nested within norm groupings.
Following conventions in event history analysis, our dichoto-
mous dependent variables are coded as 1 in the year of norm
commitment (or recognition), 0 in all preceding years, and
missing for years after. We exclude observations prior to
norm emergence, as determined by Google Ngram data.13
To account for heterogeneity inherent to the data, we
include random effects for IO, norm, and year. IO random
effects allow us to adjust for unobserved, time-invariant
IO-specific factors, such as organizational culture. Norm
random effects allow us to account for unobserved partic-
ularities of individual norms that affect IOs similarly, such
as sovereignty costs. And year random effects allow us to
control for temporally specific changes that affect all IOs,
such as global crises. Taken together, these adjustments
allow us to identify systematic determinants of norm spread
in a diverse sample of IOs and norms.
To test the effect of norm commitment by other organi-
zations in an IO’s organizational field (Hypothesis 1), we
construct the variable norm prominence in field. This variable
is based on spatial lags of prior commitments to each norm
12 Indicative of ASEAN’s resistance, this minor adjustment to R2P was under-
taken by a subsidiary body—not the ASEAN Summit—which is why it does not
register as norm recognition in our data.
13This correction minimizes the problem of zero-inflation for human security
and R2P, which were more or less unknown before 1990.
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Figure 3. Average norm commitment by institutional rules in IOs.
Notes: Categorization based on tertiles of IO scores on each variable. (Table A5 in the online appendix). Norms abbrevia-
tions: debt relief (DR), democracy promotion (DP), deregulation (DER), gender equality (GE), good governance (GG),
human security (HS), responsibility to protect (R2P), and sustainable development (SD).
among IOs in specific reference groups. We construct
spatial lags for two such reference groups: (1) other IOs in
the same region, assuming that organizations look to other
IOs in the same geographic community and (2) all other
IOs in the sample, assuming that multi-issue organizations
are inspired by their global peers (Sommerer and Tallberg
2019). The variables are the cumulated rate of prior norm
commitment, lagged by one year.14 For instance, the spa-
tial lag for norm prominence in field (region) in 2010 would
indicate that commitment to the gender equality norm was
14The spatial lags are calculated using the spmon command (Neumayer and
Plümper 2010).
50 percent among American IOs in 2009 and 33 percent
among African IOs.
We assess Hypothesis 2 through the variable norm promi-
nence in society, which captures norm references in global
public discourse. We use the Google Ngram tool and data
from the Google Books corpus of scientific and nonscien-
tific English-speaking publications (Michel et al. 2011). We
construct a 2-gram for each norm and extract time series
data from 1985 to 2008.15
We operationalize the democratic density of an IO’s
membership (Hypothesis 3) based on the mean liberal
15Google data are limited to 2008. We use the average development between
2006 and 2008 to impute data for the years 2009–2015.
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democracy index (V-Dem) of an IO’s member states in the
year of observation, calculated based on IO membership
data from the COW-IGO dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017;
Pevehouse et al. 2019). Next to electoral quality, the index
factors in the protection of civil liberties, rule of law, the in-
dependence of the judiciary, and limitations on the exercise
of executive power (Coppedge et al. 2017). IOs with more
liberal democratic memberships will have higher values on
this variable.
We assess the influence of institutional rules (Hypothesis
4) with three different indicators, reflecting our interest
in pooling, delegation, and access. We measure the effect
of majoritarian decision rules through aggregated pooling
scores taken from the Measuring International Authority
dataset (MIA) (Hooghe et al. 2017). It aggregates the
voting rules for agenda-setting and final decisions across the
state-dominated bodies of an IO, weighted by bindingness
and ratification.16
The variable delegation measures the allocation of au-
thoritative competences to non-state bodies in an IO’s
decision-making process (MIA). It aggregates political
delegation in agenda-setting, decision-making, and dispute
settlement across six decision areas: accession, suspen-
sion, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial
compliance, and policy-making.
Finally, the variable TNA access integrates data on the
depth and range of formal access to an IO’s bodies (Tallberg
et al. 2014). These two dimensions are constitutive of all
participatory arrangements by defining what rights are
granted to whom. The depth of access captures the level
of involvement offered to TNAs through institutional rules,
and the range of access captures the breadth of TNAs
entitled to participate.
Additionally, we control for several possible confounders.
First, it may be easier to reach agreement among fewer
member states (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).Membership size
equals the IO membership count in a given year (COW-IGO
data).
Second, political heterogeneity may make decision-
making on new norms more cumbersome. We adjust for
this possibility using polity heterogeneity, measured as the
standard deviation of the democratic density of the observed
IO in a given year.
Third, commitment to liberal norms might be more
likely in the presence of a major democratic power (Park
2014). The variable democratic major power is coded 1 for IOs
that include a major or regional democratic power, but lack
major or regional non-democratic powers that could veto
liberal norms.17
Fourth, IOs may be more likely to commit to norms if
they have resources to implement new policies. The cate-
gorical variable IO resources reflects the scope of staff and
budget of an IO, coded 1–5 as described in Table A4 in the
online appendix.
Finally, we include three variables in supplemental tests.
Global IO is coded as 1 for IOs with members from at least
three continents. Norm relevance is coded as 1 for IOs with a
mandate that corresponds to the norm. IO productivity is the
count of key decisions made by the main interstate body in
the year of observation.
Results
Table 1 reports the results of the pooled multilevel mod-
els on IO norm commitment. We specify models so as to
16For a full description of the coding of this variable see Hooghe et al. 2017,
213–17.
17Major powers operationalized based on COW data; we add regional powers
for the period after 1989 (Cline et al. 2011).
alternate the two measures of norm prominence in field. Due
to correlation between delegation and TNA access (r = 0.796),
we estimate models with both variables included and either
variable excluded. These combinations result in six models.
As Table 1 indicates, neither norm prominence in field
(region) (Hypothesis 1) nor norm prominence in society (Hy-
pothesis 2) is a statistically significant determinant of norm
commitment. Norm prominence in field (global) (Hypothesis
1) partly diverges from this pattern, showing positive and
significant coefficients in two models (2 and 6). Taken
together, these results grant weak support for global
scripts as an explanation of IOs’ commitments to liberal
norms.
By contrast, Table 1 offers strong support for the account
privileging democratic density and institutional design as
explanations of norm commitment. The coefficient for
democratic density (Hypothesis 3) is positive and statistically
significant at the 95 percent confidence level (or higher) in
all models. This finding confirms the impression from the
descriptive analysis that full policies on liberal norms are
concentrated in IOs with more democratic memberships.
We also find clear support for the expectation that IOs
with more pooled decision-making, empowered bureaucra-
cies, and openness to TNAs will exhibit higher rates of norm
commitment (Hypothesis 4). The coefficient for pooling is
positive and statistically significant in all models, suggesting
that when IOs allow for majority decision-making, state en-
trepreneurs (or other entrepreneurs that have to build sup-
port among member states) are more likely to be successful
and the IO more likely to commit to a norm. A case in point
is the UNGA’s adoption of the 2005 resolution on R2P, in
which state entrepreneurs built cross-regional coalitions
that could ensure the required level of support, leading
outstanding recalcitrant states to give in (Bellamy 2017).
Similarly, the coefficients on delegation are positive and
statistically significant in all models. This means that IOs
whose supranational bureaucracies have been vested with
higher agenda-setting, implementation, and enforcement
powers present more favorable conditions to norm com-
mitment. The EU represents a typical example of this
pattern. This IO exhibits the highest degree of delegation
in our sample, reflecting the far-reaching powers of the
European Commission, and also has a very high rate of
norm commitment. Speaking to the opposite end of the
scale, the OIC features a severely constrained secretariat,
leaving it with few tools to exercise norm entrepreneurship
vis-à-vis the OIC Council, which likely contributes to the low
commitment rate of the OIC.18 A case where delegation to
a pro-norm bureaucracy explicitly is credited with the adop-
tion of legally binding policies is that of good governance
in the AU (Leininger 2015, 63–65).
Finally, the results indicate that TNA access has predictive
power. The positive and significant coefficients in Models
3 and 4 suggest that IOs that provide greater opportunities
for TNAs to participate in policy-making are more likely to
commit to liberal norms. The high correlation between TNA
access and delegation, discussed above, should be borne in
mind when interpreting the results for TNA access in Models
1 and 2. Organizations that rank high on TNA access, such
as the OAS, are likely to have experienced more intense
norm entrepreneurship by TNAs than IOs that remain inac-
cessible to TNAs, like ASEAN or SCO. A case in which TNAs
are claimed to have played a major role in pushing member
states to commit to a liberal norm is gender equality in the
UN (Joachim 2003). Conversely, a case of TNAs with
limited access failing to convince the IO of norm
18The mean (non-scaled) delegation score of OIC is 0.08, whereas that of the
EU is 0.62.
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Table 1. PEHA estimates of norm commitment among eighteen IOs, 1980–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Norm prominence in field (region) 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Norm prominence in field (global) 0.66* 0.58 0.71*
(0.33) (0.32) (0.34)
Norm prominence in society 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.51 0.53 0.51
(0.52) (0.46) (0.51) (0.46) (0.51) (0.45)
Democratic density 1.05** 1.13** 0.73* 0.78* 1.15** 1.24**
(0.40) (0.38) (0.36) (0.33) (0.39) (0.37)
Pooling 0.52* 0.55* 0.63** 0.67** 0.53* 0.57*
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Delegation 0.65* 0.69* 0.82** 0.85**
(0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)
TNA access 0.38 0.34 0.65** 0.63*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.25)
Membership size 1.57** 1.69** 1.06** 1.13** 1.60** 1.73**
(0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.40) (0.44) (0.46)
Polity heterogeneity −0.20 −0.27 −0.17 −0.22 −0.17 −0.24
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)
Democratic major power 0.66 0.80* 0.58 0.70 0.66 0.80*
(0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) (0.37) (0.39)
IO resources −1.02* −1.09* −0.55 −0.58 −0.94* −1.04*
(0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49)
Time 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Time2 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −6.40** −5.61** −6.27** −5.67** −6.34** −5.62**
(1.32) (1.20) (1.27) (1.18) (1.28) (1.17)
Observations 3,176 3,176 3,176 3,176 3,185 3,205
Norms 8 8 8 8 8 8
IOs 18 18 18 18 18 18
Years 36 36 36 36 36 36
Log likelihood −190.99 −189.34 −193.61 −192.28 −191.98 −190.14
AIC 413.98 410.68 417.22 414.56 413.95 410.28
BIC 511.00 507.70 508.17 505.51 504.95 501.36
Notes: *p< .05; **p< .01. All models estimated in R version 3.5.1. Logit estimator. Errors in parenthesis. Standardized explanatory variables. Random
effects for IOs, norms, and years.
commitment is ASEAN in the case of human security
(Allison and Taylor 2017).
The control variables provide additional insight into the
conditions that favor IO norm commitment. Membership size
has positive and significant effects in all models, suggesting
that large IOs are more likely to commit to liberal norms.
This result may be driven partly by the high commitment
rate of the UN. Democratic major power shows positive and sta-
tistically significant coefficients in twomodels (2 and 6). The
negative finding for IO resources (Models 1–2, 5–6) indicates
that large and well-resourced bureaucracies do not facilitate,
and may even counteract, commitments to liberal norms.
Overall, we find strong evidence that democratic mem-
berships and institutional rules that facilitate norm en-
trepreneurship are conducive to norm commitment. Do
they also account for shallower talk about norms by IOs?
We examine this question using norm recognition as the de-
pendent variable (Table 2). Here we find stronger support
for the logic of global scripts. When norm prominence in field
is operationalized as the cumulative recognition by other
IOs in the same region, the positive effect is significant at
the 95 percent confidence level (Models 7, 9, and 11). The
alternative indicator based on previous recognition among
all other multi-issue IOs is positive but not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels (p = 0.08). Norm prominence
in society also has a statistically significant positive effect. The
overall impression is that the global scripts account shows
a strong explanatory fit with IO talk of norms. This finding
is consistent with sociological institutionalist notions of
ceremonial, rather than profound, adaptation to external
standards of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
In a similar vein, Table 2 suggests democratic member-
ships and institutional rules are not essential to shallow
talk about norms. Democratic density is not a statistically
significant determinant of norm recognition by IOs (Mod-
els 7–12). These results are in line with the descriptive
finding that norm recognition is common among IOs re-
gardless of democratic density, suggesting that autocracies
may see the legitimation benefits (and limited political
costs) of rhetorically recognizing liberal norms.19 Similarly,
with one exception, institutional rules permissive to norm
entrepreneurs do not appear to significantly contribute to
19For a parallel example, see Rocabert et al. 2019.
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Table 2. PEHA estimates of norm recognition among eighteen IOs, 1980–2015
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Norm prominence in field (region) 0.47* 0.46* 0.48*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Norm prominence in field (global) 0.50 0.52 0.50
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30)
Norm prominence in society 0.71* 0.69* 0.68* 0.65* 0.73* 0.72**
(0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Democratic density 0.01 0.16 −0.22 −0.09 −0.07 0.10
(0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.25) (0.24)
Pooling 0.12 0.01 0.27 0.15 0.10 −0.02
(0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18)
Delegation 0.66** 0.63** 0.57** 0.54**
(0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19)
TNA access −0.13 −0.16 0.11 0.06
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Membership size 0.64 0.92* 0.12 0.39 0.47 0.79*
(0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.43) (0.41) (0.39)
Polity heterogeneity 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.21
(0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18)
Democratic major power 0.64 0.79* 0.59 0.75 0.51 0.68*
(0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.39) (0.31) (0.31)
IO resources −0.002 −0.12 0.52 0.43 0.12 −0.03
(0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.39) (0.39)
Time 0.17* 0.15 0.18* 0.17* 0.19* 0.17*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Time2 −0.01* −0.01* −0.01* −0.01* −0.01* −0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −4.47** −4.21** −4.68** −4.52** −4.47** −4.26**
(0.80) (0.90) (0.81) (0.91) (0.78) (0.89)
Observations 2,241 2,241 2,241 2,241 2,250 2,270
Norms 8 8 8 8 8 8
IOs 18 18 18 18 18 18
Years 36 36 36 36 36 36
Log likelihood −306.67 −308.11 −310.40 −311.51 −311.08 −313.13
AIC 645.34 648.21 650.79 653.03 652.16 656.25
BIC 736.77 739.65 736.51 738.75 737.94 742.17
Notes: *p< .05; **p< .01. All models estimated in R version 3.5.1. Logit estimator. Errors in parenthesis. Standardized explanatory variables. Random
effects for IOs, norms, and years. The lower N in models estimating norm recognition compared with models of norm commitment (table 1) is
caused by the survival character of our data. Recognition typically predates commitment and thus leads to an earlier exit point.
norm recognition. Pooling has positive coefficients (Models
7–11), but is not statistically significant. The results for
TNA access on norm recognition are also not significant.
Delegation, however, is positively correlated with norm
recognition and is statistically significant. This suggests
that independent supranational bureaucracies facilitate
both norm recognition and commitment by IOs. Democratic
major power has a positive, statistically significant effect in
two models (8 and 12), suggesting a powerful democratic
state may boost the likelihood of IO norm recognition.
Membership size also has a positive effect on norm recogni-
tion in all models and is statistically significant in Models 8
and 12.
To contrast the difference between fully committing to
a norm and only recognizing it, we calculate predicted
probabilities. Figure 4 exhibits the annual probability of
norm commitment and norm recognition as a function
of democratic density and norm prominence (region), as
these move from one standard deviation below the mean to
one standard deviation above.20 The figure suggests three
20Predicted probabilities for all main variables with significant effects are pre-
sented in the online appendix.
points. First, there is a general difference in probability
between norm commitment and norm recognition, the first
being considerably less common. Second, for commitment,
norm prominence in field does not matter, whereas democratic
density does. IOs with less democratic memberships are
extremely unlikely to commit to norms in any given year.
Increasing this variable from one standard deviation below
the mean to one above yields about one percent higher like-
lihood of commitment. Aggregated over longer periods of
time, such differences in annual probabilities can account
for a considerable amount of the variation we observe in
our sample.21 Third, for recognition, norm prominence in field
matters but democratic density does not. An increase in norm
prominence from one standard deviation below the mean
to one above translates into about a three percent higher
probability of adoption.
21 For example, over 30 years, an IO with a democratic density exceeding the
average by one standard deviation has a 29.6 percent probability of norm com-
mitment, compared with 3 percent for an IO with one standard deviation below.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqaa046/5870860 by guest on 17 July 2020
12 Why International Organizations Commit to Liberal Norms
  
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Democratic density
An
nu
a
l p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f n
or
m
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t
(a)
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Norm prominence in field (region)
An
nu
a
l p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f n
or
m
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t
(b)
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Democratic density
An
nu
a
l p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f n
or
m
 
re
co
gn
itio
n
(c)
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Norm prominence in field (region)
An
nu
a
l p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f n
or
m
 
re
co
gn
itio
n
(d)
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of norm commitment and norm recognition as a function of democratic density and norm
prominence (region). Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated based on Model 1 and Model 7. Categorical variables held at reference value;
continuous variables held at mean.
Robustness
We assess the robustness of the results with a series of ad-
ditional models, reported in the supplementary appendix.
First, while the main models include random effects for
IOs, it is possible that IOs in particular geographic regions
are subject to common influences that retard or accelerate
norm adoption (e.g., Risse 2016). In Table A6 in the online
appendix, we add four region dummies, coded as 1 for
IOs headquartered in the corresponding region and 0
otherwise. Our key findings are robust to this alteration,
which also suggests that norm adoption in our sample
is not subject to significant and consistent geographic
variation.
Second, we add controls pertaining to the heterogeneity
of IOs in the sample (Table A7 in the online appendix).
The great majority of the results remain unchanged when
controlling for the global/regional orientation of IOs, the
fit of IO mandates with norms, and the productivity of
IOs. Importantly, the results for democratic density, delegation,
and pooling are robust to the addition of these variables.
In addition, the variables representing global scripts are
insignificant in the norm commitment models, but have
explanatory power with regard to norm recognition, as in
the main results. Substantially, we observe that global IOs
(Table A7 in the online appendix, Models 1 and 4) and
IOs with a mandate offering a closer fit with the respective
norm (Models 2 and 5) are not more likely to commit to
norms. The productivity of an IO in issuing decisions does
not matter either, although the number of observations is
lower in these models (Models 3 and 6).
Third, we want to ensure that our results are robust to
alternative operationalizations of democratic density. In
Table A8 in the online appendix, we report results based
on an operationalization of democratic density as the share
of democratic states, using the Democracy–Dictatorship
data (Cheibub et al. 2010). We find that this variable
also predicts norm commitment but with greater variance
than our preferred measure. In the same table, we also
estimate the effect on norm commitment of the KOF
Political Globalization Index, which measures a country’s
IO memberships, treaty ratifications, and bilateral invest-
ment treaties (Models 5 and 6) (Gygli et al. 2019). We
calculate annual averages of IO memberships and find
that political globalization is not a significant predictor
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of norm commitment (and even negatively predicts norm
recognition).
Fourth, we assess whether our results are sensitive to
sub-sample analysis. Table A9 in the online appendix
presents models fitted on data excluding the three norms
that have markedly lower commitments (R2P, deregula-
tion, and human security) than the other five norms. The
results differ only marginally from the full sample results,
with democratic density and institutional rules predict-
ing norm commitment while norm prominence predicts
recognition. In the same table, we also present the results
for a sub-sample analysis excluding the organizations with
the least democratic memberships (SCO, AMU, ASEAN,
and OIC).
Taken as a whole, our analysis reveals that norm com-
mitment is best predicted by the degree of democratic
density in an IO’s membership and the extent to which
its institutional design empowers norm entrepreneurs. In
contrast, global scripts about appropriate action are mainly
helpful in explaining more rhetorical recognition of norms
by IOs.
Conclusion
Global governance has witnessed the spread of a range of
liberal norms over recent decades. While earlier research
has examined the trajectory of individual norms, we have
known little about the broader patterns of norm commit-
ment by IOs. This article is an effort to address this situation
through a comparative, large-N analysis of commitments
to eight liberal norms across eighteen IOs in the time
period 1980–2015. Theoretically, we have examined the
explanatory power of two accounts: a common explanation
focused on the influence of global scripts, as IOs look
to their external environment for legitimate standards,
and our alternative explanation, privileging the internal
conditions of IOs, with a particular focus on how demo-
cratic memberships and institutional rules facilitate norm
entrepreneurship.
The findings mainly support our explanation, while also
pointing to important complementarities. While global
scripts account for an IO’s willingness to recognize norms,
they face greater problems explaining the move from talk to
commitment. Instead, deep commitments to liberal norms
depend on democratic memberships and permissive insti-
tutional rules, resulting in a concentration of liberal norm
adoption in the democratic core of IOs. These findings
suggest that a focus on global scripts would risk missing
the sources and patterns of more consequential norm
commitments by IOs. Only by looking at the organizational
context in which a norm is translated into policy can we
account for the varying nature of commitments to liberal
norms in global governance.
Expanding the perspective, this article suggests four
broader implications. First, it demonstrates how careful
empirical measurement helps to identify the multiple logics
of action that drive IOs, as well as the scope conditions
under which they hold. Considering whether and how to
reconcile sociological and rationalist logics of action has
been a concern of both general social theorists and IR
scholars (Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003, March and
Olsen 2006). This article shows how empirical testing may
allow us to move beyond competitive generalizations to
identify the scope conditions and complementarities of
institutionalist theories. While global scripts explain norm
talk well, democratic density and institutional design are
central determinants of more consequential commitments.
Second, our analysis shows how a large-N approach can
complement qualitative work on norm entrepreneurship
by identifying general sources of variation in norm spread
(cf. Finnemore 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998;
True and Mintrom 2001; Joachim 2003; Park and Vetterlein
2010). While existing research is strong on theorizing and
documenting norm entrepreneurship by states, interna-
tional bureaucracies, and TNAs, it is relatively weaker on
establishing the political conditions that shape norm trajec-
tories in a comparative perspective. This article shows that
important conditions affecting the likelihood of successful
norm entrepreneurship relate to the composition of IO
memberships and the institutional constraints encountered
at IOs—factors not previously assessed in a comparative
analysis.
Third, our analysis raises questions relating to the ef-
fectiveness or performance of IOs (Hafner-Burton, von
Stein, and Gartzke 2008; Gutner and Thompson 2010; Lall
2017). This article addresses commitment to norms by IOs
and stops short of tracing how these policies subsequently
impact behavior on the ground—a process that research on
norm effectiveness aptly covers (e.g., Simmons 2009; Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 2013; Zimmermann 2017). But a focus
on IOs’ commitments to norms has several implications. Im-
portantly, the fact that IOs more rarely commit to, than rec-
ognize, norms indicates that the effectiveness of norms may
be lower than often assumed based on their prominence
in overall discourse. IOs frequently stop at rhetorical recog-
nition of global norms. In addition, our overview indicates
gaps in the extent to which IOs respond to societal problems
through the development of extensive policy committed
to remedying those issues. For instance, despite extensive
intrastate conflict, norms aimed at protecting civilians—
R2P and human security—hardly gain traction outside
the UN.
Fourth, this article carries consequences for research
on the liberal international order and the retrenchment
of liberal norms. This literature conventionally focuses
on how the United States upholds this order and on the
implications of power shifts for its long-term sustainability
(Ikenberry 2011; Dunne and Flockhart 2013; Acharya
2014). This article offers several important insights. It
suggests that the liberal order is more fragmented than
often assumed. Liberal norms heralded as center-pieces of
this order often travel little beyond their Western origins.
At the same time, the liberal international order, as ex-
pressed through liberal norms, appears to rest on broader
underpinnings than US power. For deep commitments to
liberal norms in global governance, it is not primarily the
status of a lone major power (the US) that matters, but
democratic memberships as a whole and the institutional
empowerment of supranational bureaucracies and TNAs.
Taken together, these observations suggest why we may be
observing a contemporary retrenchment of liberal norms
in world politics (Cooley 2015; Diamond et al. 2016). While
liberal norms were never truly supported by IO member-
ships outside the democratic core of global governance,
which cannot be counted on for backing, a shift toward
illiberal democracy in IO memberships within this core
now contributes to a weakening of liberal norms from
within.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the International
Studies Quarterly data archive.
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